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Technological solutions to privacy questions: what is the role of law?
Maria Helen Murphy*
Law Department, Maynooth University, Co. Kildare, Ireland
In spite of its recognition as a fundamental human right, privacy is sometimes criticised
as an anachronistic value in modern life [James Rule, Privacy in Peril (OUP, 2007) xi].
While the prominence of this view has lessened in the wake of the Snowden revelations
and increased public concern with online privacy [Maria Helen Murphy, ‘The Pendulum
Effect: Comparisons Between the Snowden Revelations and the Church Committee.
What are the Potential Implications for Europe?’ (2014) 23(2) Information and
Communications Technology Law 192], the right continues to struggle for support
when it is portrayed as being in competition with national security, personal safety,
and economic prosperity [Daniel Solove, ‘“I’ve Got Nothing to Hide” and other
Misunderstandings of Privacy’ (2007) 44 San DLR 745]. As developments in
technology continue to threaten the right to privacy, interest in technological solutions
to privacy problems continues to grow. This article seeks to consider current privacy
debates from the perspectives of multiple stakeholders in order to assess whether
technological and design approaches offer the best path forward, or whether an
essential role remains to be played by law.
Keywords: privacy by design; encryption; incentives; technology
Introduction
Privacy is widely found in international human rights instruments, but in spite of this legal
recognition, privacy has been criticised as a moribund right of little value in the modern
world.1 In the post-Snowden environment, however, there has been a reinvigoration of
the privacy debate.2 Even some so-called ‘digital natives’ have expressed renewed interest
in privacy and have, to an extent, voted with their feet, by embracing Internet services that
market the privacy conscious features of their products as key selling points.3 While
increased focus on anonymity tools and encryption software appears to be a positive
sign for the continued protection of privacy rights, important questions remain regarding
the role law has to play in this context.4
© 2016 Taylor & Francis
*Email: maria.murphy@nuim.ie
1James Rule, Privacy in Peril (OUP, 2007) xi.
2Maria Helen Murphy, ‘The Pendulum Effect: Comparisons between the Snowden Revelations and
the Church Committee. What are the Potential Implications for Europe?’ (2014) 23(2) Information
and Communications Technology Law 192.
3Parmy Olson, ‘Delete By Default: Why More Snapchat-Like Messaging Is On Its Way’ Forbes (22
November 2013) <www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2013/11/22/delete-by-default-why-more-snapchat-
like-messaging-is-on-its-way/> accessed 27 August 2015; Chris Johnston, ‘DuckDuckGo Traffic Soars
in Wake of Snowden Revelations’ The Guardian (London 17 June 2015) <www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/jun/17/duckduckgo-traffic-snowden-revelations> accessed 27 August 2015.
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The Snowden revelations clarified and confirmed the vast capabilities of modern
intelligence agencies. As technology improves – and as individual engagement with
communications technology increases – it is almost trite to state that privacy protecting
laws often lag behind technological developments.5 Technological solutions to privacy
problems, however, can be much more responsive to new and evolving threats to privacy.
Many in the technology community have adopted the development of privacy protecting
solutions as a mission and have designed tools that protect against personal, corporate,
and government surveillance. Equally, however, governments seek to counter such tools
of opacity by both exploiting technological weaknesses and exploring legal options in an
effort to hinder their continued development. This article examines the challenges to
privacy that exist in the modern world and considers what role legislative tools have
to play in the protection of privacy in this red queen’s race. In order to illustrate how
technological solutions can further the protection of privacy, this article considers the
potential of adopting a ‘privacy by design’ approach in the context of unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs, commonly known as ‘drones’). Building from this analysis,
this article assesses the role encryption can play in the protection of online communi-
cations. Crucially, even though encryption is a technological tool used to protect
privacy, this article considers the role that law and legal rights can play in the restriction
and use of such tools. An important aspect of the approach adopted in this article is the
continued focus on the knowable incentives of the various stakeholders. The author
maintains that cognisance of such motivations is essential if effective solutions are to
be identified.
Different interests
It is clear that the protection of privacy involves many interests. The manner in which privacy
protections are implemented has implications for numerous actorswith sometimes overlapping
4It is not unusual for government to seek alternative means to regulate behaviour in addition or in
place of legislative action. For example, a government can make undesirable conduct more difficult
or impossible through ‘architecture’ modifications. A simple example of this is when a government
installs speed bumps in order to deter speeding. Ryan Calo, ‘Code, Nudge, or Notice’ (2014) 99
Iowa L Rev 773, 778. Architectural solutions have particular benefits in the context of the Internet
as famously articulated by Lawrence Lessig. According to Lessig’s major text on this issue ‘The soft-
ware and hardware that make cyberspace what it is constitute a set of constraints on how you can
behave. The substance of these constraints may vary, but they are experienced as conditions on
your access to cyberspace.’ According to Lessig
[t]he code or software or architecture or protocols set these features; they are features selected by
codewriters; they constrain some behavior bymaking other behavior possible, or impossible.…
In this sense, it too is regulation, just as the architectures of real-space codes are regulations.
Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (Basic Books, 1999) 89. See also, Lawrence
Lessig, Code: Version 2.0 (Basic Books, 2006); Joel Reidenberg has argued that code is a ‘useful
extra-legal instrument that may be used to achieve objectives that otherwise challenge conventional
laws’. Joel Reidenberg, ‘Lex Informatica: The Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through
Technology’ (1998) 76 Tex L Rev 553, 556.
5Daniel Solove, Understanding Privacy (Harvard University Press, 2008) 62–63; Mark O’ Brien,
‘Law, Privacy, and Information Technology: A Sleepwalk through the Surveillance Society?’
(2008) 17 ICTL 25, 28.
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– and sometimes diverging – motivations. This article highlights four key stakeholders that
must be considered when evaluating policy choices in this area: the individual/consumer,
the government and its’ agencies, technology companies, and security professionals. It is
important to recognise the multiplicity of interests that influence each of these actors.
The individual/consumer, for example, has several interests at issue. For one, the indi-
vidual/consumer wishes to enjoy the consumer goods produced by technology companies.
The effectiveness of Internet services – such as Google Now – may, at times, require the
collection of large amounts of personal data.6 It could be argued that a better consumer
experience is provided where this information is collected seamlessly and with minimal
interruption or involvement of the consumer. In spite of this incentive to share data with
technology companies, the individual/consumer also has an interest in the protection of
privacy from both an individual and a societal perspective.7 In addition, many individ-
uals/consumers will identify an interest in government surveillance where such surveillance
assists in crime control and national security. Accordingly, we can readily identify three dis-
tinct interests that have the potential to influence the attitude and approach of the average
individual to privacy protection.
Technology companies are another key actor and they have clear economic incentives to
collect large amounts of data.8 Online services are also incentivised to store data unen-
crypted as it is much easier to monetise than unreadable data.9 In addition to this motiv-
ation, technology companies are incentivised to keep both governments and customers
happy. With the ongoing migration of communications to the Internet and the Cloud, tech-
nology companies have become a ‘key component of the surveillance infrastructure’.10 As
governments have a surveillance interest in accessing stored data, technology companies
may be encouraged to increase their collection and retention of personal information. Of
course, as some Internet services operate more effectively with large data sets, increasing
the collection and retention may also provide the company with some competitive advan-
tage. Equally, however, where a company is facing back-lash from privacy conscious users
they will be incentivised to build in additional privacy protections and to minimise certain
types of data collection.11
The primary goal of a security engineer is to ensure the relevant system is ‘dependable
in the face of malice, error, or mischance’.12 As adequate information security is a condition
precedent for privacy, the work of security engineers has significant benefits for the
6Simon Hill, ‘How to get the Best out of Google Now’ Digital Trends (11 June 2015) <www.
digitaltrends.com/users/simonhill/> accessed 27 August 2015.
7Privacy plays an essential role in liberal democratic society. Alan Westin, Privacy and Freedom
(Atheneum, 1967) 24.
8Perry Rotella, ‘Is Data The New Oil?’ Forbes (2 April 2012) <www.forbes.com/sites/perryrotella/
2012/04/02/is-data-the-new-oil/> accessed 27 August 2015.
9For example, if data stored on a service is encrypted and the service provider is not privy to the key,
the company will be unable to analyse that data in order to display targeted advertising. Christopher
Soghoian, ‘Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in the Web 2.0
Era’ (2010) 8 J Telecomm & High Tech L 359, 395.
10Christopher Soghoian, ‘Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government Back Doors in
the Web 2.0 Era’ (2010) 8 J Telecomm & High Tech L 359, 395, 386.
11Fatemeh Khatibloo and others, ‘When Customers Take Control’ (Forrester, July 2015) <https://
www.forrester.com/Brief+When+Customers+Take+Control/fulltext/-/E-res121723> accessed 27
August 2015.
12Ross Anderson, Security Engineering: A Guide to Building Dependable Distributed Systems
(Wiley, 2010) 3.
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protection of privacy. While secure systems help protect the privacy rights that are impor-
tant for individuals, secure systems also provide significant economic and societal benefits
that both technology companies and governments value.13 The other side to this, of course,
is that secure systems can pose a challenge to governments with an interest in surveillance.
This throws the conflict between these competing goals into sharp relief.
Appreciation of these overlapping and diverging interests is important as it provides the
context necessary to address the question of how we may choose to regulate this area. It is
clear that these relationships are complex and should not be reduced to general assumptions.
This point is illustrated well by the nuanced relationship between the citizen and the state in
this area. While the interests of the individual/consumer and his or her government may
seem to be diametrically opposed when viewed from a privacy and surveillance perspective,
the protection of Internet and national security results in some overlap between the interests
of both parties. As additional overlapping interests can be identified, it is important to focus
and foster common interests. Such an approach has the potential to be more effective than
solely relying on legal means of control.
Privacy by design
Awell-established example of a more technological- or design-based approach to privacy
protection is the ‘privacy by design’ approach. While ‘privacy by design’ is a well-estab-
lished concept, it is important to consider the definition of the term in order to orient the dis-
cussion.14 The principle of privacy by design has been described as a ‘systematic approach to
designing any technology that embeds privacy into the underlying specifications or architec-
ture’.15While a privacy by design approach is frequently described as constituting best prac-
tice, the approach has also been increasingly mandated as an essential aspect of data
protection law compliance. For example, the proposed European Union Data Protection
Regulation requires the adoption of data protection by design and by default.16
13European Commission, ‘Cybersecurity’ (European Commission Digital Agenda for Europe, 2
March 2015) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/cybersecurity> accessed 27 August 2015.
14It is interesting to note that while the concept of privacy by design originated from the Office of the
Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, the principle has subsequently been recognised as
‘an essential component of fundamental privacy protection’ globally. Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by
Design (Information and Privacy Commissioner 2009) 1 <https://www.ipc.on.ca/images/resources/
privacybydesign.pdf> accessed 27 August 2015.
15Ira Rubinstein, ‘Regulating Privacy by Design’ (2011) 26 Berkeley Tech LJ 1410, 1411–1412; Ann
Cavoukian, Privacy by Design (Information and Privacy Commissioner 2009) 1 <https://www.ipc.on.
ca/images/resources/privacybydesign.pdf> accessed 27 August 2015; Maria Helen Murphy, ‘The
Introduction of Smart Meters in Ireland: Privacy Implications and the Role of Privacy by Design’
(2015) 38(1) Dublin University Law Journal.
16It is important to note that the draft Regulation does not provide additional details as to what
‘privacy by design’ entails or what types of technical solutions such an approach requires. Bert-
Jaap Koops and Ronald Leenes, ‘Privacy Regulation Cannot be Hardcoded. A Critical Comment
on the “Privacy By Design” Provision in Data-Protection Law’ (2014) 28 IRLCT 159, 160. Commis-
sion (EC), ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Protection
of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of such Data
(General Data Protection Regulation)’ COM (2012) 11 final. Regardless of potential reforms, it has
been argued that a privacy by design requirement is already implied by Article 17 of the Data Protec-
tion Directive. Ian Brown, ‘Britain’s Smart Meter Programme: A Case Study in Privacy by Design’
(2014) 28 IRLCT 172, 176; Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
October 1995 on the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on
the Free Movement of Such Data [1995] OJ L281/31.
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For the purposes of this article, one of the most relevant tenets of the privacy by design
approach is that privacy by design should be applied in a ‘positive-sum’ manner where
possible. Instead of relying on trade-offs between privacy and other interests, a privacy
by design approach seeks a solution that best reconciles the different aims.17 As it has
been put by Privacy by Design’s most noted advocate, Ann Cavoukian:
Privacy can and must co-exist alongside other critical requirements: security, functionality,
operational efficiency, organizational control, business processes, and usability in a ‘posi-
tive-sum’, or doubly enabling ‘win-win’ equation. How we get there is through Privacy by
Design.18
This approach aims to incentivise the protection of privacy by rejecting the ‘zero-sum
paradigm’ that characterises privacy as an ‘impediment standing in the way of inno-
vation and desired goals’.19 It has been shown that many of the features of a privacy
by design approach – such as data minimisation and data security – will not impair
the legitimate goals of innovation where privacy is considered from the initial design
stages.20
UAVs and privacy by design
A key aspect of the privacy by design approach calls for the privacy implications of new
systems and technologies to be considered from the outset.21 Such early consideration
avoids costly retrofitting and facilitates the adoption of privacy maximising solutions that
do not interfere with the core purpose of a new system or technology.22 The principles
of privacy by design have broad potential applicability. For example, it has been argued
that technology companies – including Google and Facebook – would have avoided
privacy scandals and loss of consumer confidence without negatively affecting their per-
formance if the companies had adopted a privacy by design approach.23 It is also contended
that the adoption of privacy by design when designing large infrastructural programmes has
the potential to save governments significant resources and avoid public relations
17Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy and Radical Pragmatism: Change the Paradigm’ (Information and Privacy
Commissioner 2008) 16 <http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/radicalpragmatism_1.pdf> accessed
27 August 2015.
18Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy by Design: The Definitive Workshop, a Foreword’ (2010) 3 Identity in the
Information Society 247–51, 248.
19Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy and Radical Pragmatism: Change the Paradigm’ (Information and Privacy
Commissioner 2008) 16 <http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/radicalpragmatism_1.pdf> accessed
27 August 2015; Maria Helen Murphy, ‘The Introduction of Smart Meters in Ireland: Privacy Impli-
cations and the Role of Privacy by Design’ (2015) 38(1) Dublin University Law Journal.
20Ann Cavoukian, ‘Privacy and Radical Pragmatism: Change the Paradigm’ (Information and Privacy
Commissioner 2008) 16 <http://www.ipc.on.ca/images/Resources/radicalpragmatism_1.pdf> accessed
27 August 2015; Maria Helen Murphy, ‘The Introduction of Smart Meters in Ireland: Privacy Impli-
cations and the Role of Privacy by Design’ (2015) 38(1) Dublin University Law Journal.
21Ann Cavoukian, Privacy by Design (Information and Privacy Commissioner 2009) 1 <https://www.
ipc.on.ca/images/resources/privacybydesign.pdf> accessed 27 August 2015.
22Ian Brown, ‘Britain’s Smart Meter Programme: A Case Study in Privacy by Design’ (2014) 28
IRLCT 172, 176; Maria Helen Murphy, ‘The Introduction of Smart Meters in Ireland: Privacy Impli-
cations and the Role of Privacy by Design’ (2015) 38(1) Dublin University Law Journal.
23Ira Rubinstein and Nathan Good, ‘Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and
Facebook Privacy Incidents’ (2013) 28 Berkeley Tech LJ 1333.
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problems.24 The recent popularisation of UAV technology provides a useful and timely
example to illustrate the merits of a privacy by design approach.25
With the increased sophistication and proliferation of UAV technology, there are
growing regulatory and privacy challenges surrounding the use of UAVs. From the basic
regulatory angle, there are safety and security concerns.26 In addition to these issues, the
increased adoption of UAVs also raises clear privacy questions.27 In the past, UAVs
have been used primarily as a military technology, but due to the reduction in price and
increased accessibility of such technologies, the recreational user is growing in
significance.28
The use of recreational UAVs has been a popular topic of debate in recent years, and the
technology attracted significant news coverage in 2015 when a UAV landed on White
House property.29 While this was an accidental landing, the incident highlighted the
security risk created by the technology. One interesting outcome of the scandal was the
imposition of a ‘no drone zone’ over Washington, DC, by the market-leading UAV manu-
facturer, DJI.30 DJI upgraded their firmware geo-fencing software in order to prevent
Phantom UAVs from flying over the Washington, DC, area in the future.31 This decision
supports the existing Federal Aviation Administration rules that deemWashington, DC, air-
space to be a flight restricted zone.32 The geo-fencing restrictions imposed by DJI on its
customers could be seen as a service enhancement that prevents an informed customer
from unwittingly breaking the law.
24Ian Brown, ‘Britain’s Smart Meter Programme: A Case Study in Privacy by Design’ (2014) 28
IRLCT 172, 176; Maria Helen Murphy, ‘The Introduction of Smart Meters in Ireland: Privacy Impli-
cations and the Role of Privacy by Design’ (2015) 38(1) Dublin University Law Journal.
25Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 01/2015 on Privacy and Data Protection Issues
Relating to the Utilisation of Drones’ (Adopted on 16 June 2015) <ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2015/wp231_en.pdf> accessed
27 August 2015.
26Roger Clarke and Lyria Bennett Moses, ‘The Regulation of Civilian Drones: Impacts on Public
Safety’ (2014) 30 CLSR 263.
27Benjamin Kapnik, ‘Unmanned But Accelerating: Navigating The Regulatory and Privacy Chal-
lenges of Introducing Unmanned Aircraft into the National Airspace System’ (2012) 77 J Air L &
Com 439.
28Kevin Poulsen, ‘Why the US Government Is Terrified of Hobbyist Drones’Wired (5 February 2015)
<www.wired.com/brandlab/2015/02/white-house-drone/> accessed 27 August 2015; Clay Dillow,
‘Get Ready for “Drone Nation”’ Fortune (8 October 2014) <fortune.com/2014/10/08/drone-nation-
air-droid/> accessed 27 August 2015.
29Jim Acosta and Jeremy Diamond, ‘US Intel Worker Blamed for White House Drone Crash’ CNN
(27 January 2015) <edition.cnn.com/2015/01/26/politics/white-house-device-secret-service/index.
html?iid=EL> accessed 27 August 2015; For a similar case see Michael Schmidt, ‘Secret Service
Arrests Man After Drone Flies Near White House’ New York Times (New York 14 May 2015)
<www.nytimes.com/2015/05/15/us/white-house-drone-secret-service.html> accessed 27 August
2015.
30Ben Bjostad, ‘DJI Announces No-Fly-Zone Expansion Over Washington DC’ UAV Experts (28
January 2015) <www.uavexpertnews.com/dji-announces-no-fly-zone-expansion-over-washington-d-
c/> accessed 27 August 2015.
31Ben Bjostad, ‘DJI Announces No-Fly-Zone Expansion Over Washington DC’ UAV Experts (28
January 2015) <www.uavexpertnews.com/dji-announces-no-fly-zone-expansion-over-washington-d-
c/> accessed 27 August 2015.
32Jose Pagliery, ‘No, You Can’t Fly Drones Over The White House’ CNN (26 January 2015)
<money.cnn.com/2015/01/26/technology/security/drone-white-house/> accessed 27 August
2015.
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The privacy risk posed by UAVs is heightened by low barriers-to-entry to UAVowner-
ship and the affordability of video recording technology.33 The risk is further compounded
by the difficulties of enforcement and education in the fields of data protection and privacy.
In light of these challenges, the technological solution chosen by DJI to counter the physical
security risk posed by such devices could also be applied to address the privacy risk.
While imposing broad ‘no drone zones’ would clearly have benefits for privacy, such
zones would be detrimental to the interests of UAV manufacturers and their customers.
Accordingly, when national security is not the primary concern, it makes sense to design
the technology with privacy in mind in an attempt to head off the compliance challenge
without undue cost being imposed on the multiple stakeholders. One way for UAV manu-
facturers to incorporate privacy by design principles would be to build in ‘no record zones’
as opposed to ‘no drone zones’ into their software. The location of ‘no record zones’ could
be determined based on residential status or else by an opt-out registration system.34
The advantage of such an approach is that the collection of personal data would be mini-
mised and hobbyists would not be prevented from flying their UAVs safely and in accord-
ance with privacy principles. Instead of simply expecting users to apply complex data
protection rules to their use of such technologies, privacy intrusion could be minimised
from the outset by designing privacy solutions into the products. As UAV manufacturers
have a strong incentive to appear responsible in order to make the case for less onerous
regulation, there are clear benefits for the industry to embrace such technological solutions.
While regulation may be necessary to incentivise privacy consciousness, ‘hard-coding’
compliance into a product has the potential to be more effective than expecting the
average hobbyist to educate themselves on their legal requirements. Considering the rela-
tively low risk of enforcement for the average recreational user, imposing onerous regu-
lations may in fact be more likely to encourage complete non-compliance rather than
complete non-engagement with the technology.35
While it is likely that a determined individual will be able to bypass geo-fencing restric-
tions, the privacy harm created by the average hobbyist would be greatly mitigated.36 Such
an attempt to reconcile the interests of the different stakeholders has the potential to prevent
33Not only does drone technology erase the ‘natural limits’ associated with traditional aerial surveillance,
but it also facilitates new forms of invasion. Jay Stanley, ‘WeAlreadyHave PoliceHelicopters, SoWhat’s
theBigDealOverDrones?’ (ACLU8March 2013) <https://www.aclu.org/blog/we-already-have-police-
helicopters-so-whats-big-deal-over-drones?redirect=blog/technology-and-liberty-criminal-law-reform/
we-already-have-police-helicopters-so-whats-big-deal> accessed 27 August 2015.
34To provide an example of how this might work, NoFlyZone.org is a website that allows individuals
to register their address in a database in order to notify drone operators that you do not want drones
flying over your property. While DJI has not signed up to this programme, several other major man-
ufacturers and navigation platforms (including Horizon Hobby, EHANG, and HEXO+, PixiePath and
RCFlyMaps) have. Lily Hay Newman, ‘Here’s How to Set Up a No-Fly Drone Zone Over Your
House’ Slate (10 February 2015) <www.slate.com/blogs/future_tense/2015/02/10/noflyzone_org_
lets_you_geofence_the_area_over_your_house_for_drones_to_avoid.html> accessed 27 August
2015; Frederic Lardinois, ‘NoFlyZone Lets You Establish A No-Fly Zone Over Your Property’
Tech Crunch (9 February 2015) <techcrunch.com/2015/02/09/noflyzone-lets-you-establish-a-no-fly-
zone-over-your-property/> accessed 27 August 2015.
35Tim McCarthy, ‘Geospatial Platform for Safe and Regulated and Non-Intrusive UAS Operation’
(Privacy: Gathering Insights from Lawyers and Technologists Conference, Maynooth University,
Ireland, 1 July 2015).
36Some bypassing is likely to occur, even if geo-fencing restrictions are legislatively mandated. Kevin
Poulsen, ‘Why the US Government Is Terrified of Hobbyist Drones’Wired (5 February 2015) <www.
wired.com/brandlab/2015/02/white-house-drone/> accessed 27 August 2015.
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wide-scale flouting of data protection rules and better recognises the limitations of enforce-
ment when a practice is widespread and difficult to detect. This ‘no record zone’ example
illustrates how technological solutions have the potential to enhance privacy without alie-
nating key stakeholders. With the support of product manufacturers and service providers,
the effectiveness of privacy protection should increase.
Implications of design/technological solutions to privacy questions in the
surveillance context
In spite of the existence of positive examples that illustrate the potential for positive sum sol-
utions to privacy questions in the corporate context, it is clear thatwhen considering the interests
of competing and occasionally cooperating actors, different considerations come to the fore in
the surveillance and national security context. The additional difficulties associatedwith privacy
protection in the national security context are highlighted by Daniel Solove who warns against
the temptation to summarily dismiss the classic ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ argument.37
While there aremanyways to criticise the ‘nothing to hide, nothing to fear’ position, it is impor-
tant to recognise the significant sway this position holds over many when it is applied in the
national security context.38 When considering the incentives that influence the actions of key
stakeholders, it is important to recognise the influence this argument holds.
Bearing the additional challenges that arise in the national security context in mind, the
following section addresses the importance of encryption technology for the protection of
privacy and also considers how the various stakeholders can be incentivised to support such
technology. A key aspect of this discussion considers whether governments with surveil-
lance interests can be won over by purely technological and security focused arguments
and assesses what role can be played by legal obligations.
Encryption
A clear manifestation of the struggle between privacy enhancing technologies and govern-
ment surveillance is the encryption tug-of-war that has, once again, become a significant
source of contention between technology companies and law enforcement/surveillance
agencies. A basic definition describes encryption as a ‘process of converting messages,
information, or data into a form unreadable by anyone except the intended recipient’.39
37While the ‘nothing to hide’ argument’s ‘superficial incantations can readily be refuted’, Solove
points out that when ‘the argument is made in its strongest form, it is far more formidable’. Daniel
Solove, ‘“I’ve got Nothing to Hide” and other Misunderstandings of Privacy’ (2007) 44 San DLR
745, 747, 753.
38Solove points out how
[c]ast in this manner, the nothing to hide argument is a formidable one. It balances the degree to
which an individual’s privacy is compromised by the limited disclosure of certain information
against potent national security interests. Under such a balancing scheme, it is quite difficult for
privacy to prevail.
Daniel Solove, ‘“I’ve got Nothing to Hide” and other Misunderstandings of Privacy’ (2007) 44 San
DLR 745, 753.
39See SANS Institute, ‘History of Encryption’ (SANS Institute White Paper 2001) <http://www.sans.
org/reading-room/whitepapers/vpns/history-encryption-730> accessed 27 August 2015 and Human
Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/3, 4.
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The goal of such conversion is to protect the ‘confidentiality and integrity’ of content
against unauthorised third-parties.40
Encryption can be achieved in a number of different ways. Symmetric-key encryption
uses the same secret key to encrypt data that is used to decrypt data.41 A clear challenge to
such encryption is the need to securely exchange the secret key with the party you wish to
communicate with.42 As this may often require an in-person meeting, symmetric and secret
key encryption is an unattractive solution in the modern world.43 This problem was
resolved to a significant extent with the advent of public key encryption, which utilises a
second key.44 The first key is public and can be shared with individuals who may wish
to communicate with the owner of the public key.45 By having access to the public key,
the data can be correctly encoded by the data senders. A second, private and non-inferable,
key is required to decrypt the data.46 As the data recipient is the only individual with access
to the private second key, they can decrypt the message securely.47 Asymmetric public key
encryption can also be used to transfer a symmetric secret key securely.48 While this
example explains encryption by discussing the protection of ‘data in motion’, encryption
can also be used to protect ‘data at rest’. Data at rest includes data stored on a computer
hard drive, smart phone, and now data at rest can include data stored on the Cloud.49
Historically, sophisticated encryption and decryption was primarily practiced by com-
peting governments seeking military or political advantage.50 In more recent times,
however, the significance of the Internet for communications and transactions has
ensured the importance of encryption for the general population.51 As pointed out by
40Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/3, 4; Susan
Landau, ‘Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-sector Telecommunications Infrastructure’
(2014) 7 J Nat’l Sec L & Pol’y 411, 411, 419.
41John Palfrey, ‘Security and the Basics of Encryption in E-Commerce’ (Berkman Center for Internet
and Society 2001) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ecommerce/encrypt.html> accessed 27 August
2015; Hans Delfs and Helmut Knebl, Introduction to Cryptography (Springer, 2007) 11–31.
42Hans Delfs and Helmut Knebl, Introduction to Cryptography (Springer, 2007) 11–31.
43Gordon Corera, Intercept: The Secret History of Computers and Spies (Weidenfeld & Nicholson,
2015) 112.
44John Palfrey, ‘Security and the Basics of Encryption in E-Commerce’ (Berkman Center for Internet
and Society 2001) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ecommerce/encrypt.html> accessed 27 August
2015; see Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman, ‘New Directions in Cryptography’ (1976) 22 IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory 644.
45Such public keys are now frequently seen on the Twitter pages of journalists in order to encourage
sources to make contact.
46It is non-inferable by reason of the complexity of inverting the encryption method; knowing the
public key does not benefit decryption efforts. Susan Landau, ‘Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to
Secure Private-sector Telecommunications Infrastructure’ (2014) 7 J Nat’l Sec L & Pol’y 411, 411,
419.
47John Palfrey, ‘Security and the Basics of Encryption in E-Commerce’ (Berkman Center for Internet
and Society 2001) <http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/ecommerce/encrypt.html> accessed 27 August
2015.
48Hans Delfs and Helmut Knebl, Introduction to Cryptography (Springer, 2007) 11–31.
49Frank Ohlhorst, ‘Encryption is Front-Line Defense for Data at Rest’ Tech Republic (3 July 2014)
<www.techrepublic.com/article/encryption-is-front-line-defense-for-data-at-rest/> accessed 27
August 2015.
50Gordon Corera, Intercept: The Secret History of Computers and Spies (Weidenfeld & Nicholson,
2015) 104–105.
51Gordon Corera, Intercept: The Secret History of Computers and Spies (Weidenfeld & Nicholson,
2015) 104–105.
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Sarah McKune, anonymity and encryption tools ‘impact the digital security of the vast
majority of the public’ by protecting the financial data of consumers and by defending
against ‘politically motivated digital attacks’.52 In spite of the many benefits of encryption,
some view the practice as inherently suspicious when utilised by members of the public.53
As governments world-wide have, once again, begun to speak up in opposition to
encryption technology,54 some commentators suggest that we are currently in the midst
of ‘Crypto Wars II’.55 Accordingly, it is logical to consider whether any lessons can be
gleaned from the original Crypto Wars debate. The background to ‘Crypto-Wars I’ is pro-
vided by the decision of the US government to place strong encryption systems on the
Munitions List.56 In order to export a technology that has been placed on the Munitions
List, an export licence must be obtained from the State Department.57 While exclusive
access to advanced encryption technology has clear value to government powers, signifi-
cant problems with this export focused approach began to emerge in the 1970s when
private industry had started to develop advanced cryptographic solutions in anticipation
of increased computer use in consumer transactions and communications.58
The issue became unavoidable in the 1990s when Internet transactions and mobile com-
munications were widely commercialised.59 Phil Zimmermann – the creator of the popular
email encryption software, Pretty Good Privacy –was under criminal investigation for three
years as a result of the export restrictions.60 Although exports controls only restricted pro-
ducts that were to be sent abroad, production costs and design considerations meant that
many technology companies ‘eschewed the use of strong cryptography’ in products
intended for both foreign and domestic markets.61 As Schneier points out, doing so was
52Sarah McKune, ‘Encryption, Anonymity, and the “Right to Science”’ Just Security (28 April 2015)
<justsecurity.org/22505/encryption-anonymity-debates-right-science/> accessed 27 August 2015.
53Jeffrey Vagle, ‘Furtive Encryption: Power, Trust, and the Constitutional Cost of Collective Surveil-
lance’ (2015) 90 Indiana LJ 101, 104–105.
54Of course, in spite of challenges, several governments support encryption. For example, Brazil and
Austria both have laws that protect the use of encryption by individuals. Marco Civil da Internet Law
of Brazil 2014; E-Commerce Act and Telecommunication Act of Austria 2001; Human Rights
Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to
Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/3, 13.
55Bruce Schneier, ‘More Crypto Wars II’ Schneier on Security (21 October 2014) <https://www.
schneier.com/blog/archives/2014/10/more_crypto_war.html> accessed 27 August 2015; Sascha
Meinrath and Sean Vitka, ‘Crypto War II’ (2014) 31 Critical Studies in Media Communication 123.
56Sharon Black, Telecommunications Law in the Internet Age (Morgan Kauffman, 2002) 353; US
Munitions List.
57Sharon Black, Telecommunications Law in the Internet Age (Morgan Kauffman, 2002) 353; US
Munitions List; Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and
Control Your World (WW Norton & Company, 2015) 119.
58Susan Landau, ‘Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-sector Telecommunications Infra-
structure’ (2014) 7 J Nat’l Sec L & Pol’y 411, 411, 418.
59Susan Landau, ‘Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-sector Telecommunications Infra-
structure’ (2014) 7 J Nat’l Sec L & Pol’y 411, 411, 419.
60Announcement from Philip Zimmermann’s Lead Defense Counsel (12 January 1996) <https://www.
philzimmermann.com/EN/news/PRZ_case_dropped.html> accessed 27 August 2015; Gordon Corera,
Intercept: The Secret History of Computers and Spies (Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2015) 123–124;
Steve Ranger, ‘Defending the Last Missing Pixels: Phil Zimmermann Speaks Out On Encryption,
Privacy, and Avoiding a Surveillance State’ Tech Republic (23 June 2015) <www.techrepublic.com/
article/defending-the-last-missing-pixels-phil-zimmermann/> accessed 27 August 2015.
61Susan Landau, ‘Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-sector Telecommunications Infra-
structure’ (2014) 7 J Nat’l Sec L & Pol’y 411, 411, 423; Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The
Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your World (WW Norton & Company, 2015) 119.
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‘easier than maintaining two versions’.62 A further challenge to the policy emerged with the
development of strong cryptographic tools by non-US companies and the fear that US com-
panies would be disadvantaged.63
While export controls were gradually relaxed in the wake of powerful industry opposi-
tion,64 government agencies continued to warn that intelligence collection was at risk of
‘going dark’. One response to this concern was the passing of the Communications Assist-
ance for Law Enforcement Act in 1994, which required all digital switch networks to be
susceptible to interception.65 The other innovation was the creation and endorsement of
the Clipper initiative.
In 1993, the White House hailed the Clipper initiative as bringing the Federal Govern-
ment and industry together in order to both improve telecommunications security and serve
the needs of law enforcement.66 The Clipper initiative was billed as a voluntary67 pro-
gramme that encouraged manufacturers of communications hardware to install National
Security Agency (NSA) designed microcircuits into their product in order to enable govern-
ment access to encrypted communications.68 A key component of this system was the use
of ‘key-escrow’. According to the Presidential Directive authorising the initiative, the
Attorney General would arrange for appropriate entities, with strict security procedures,
to hold the keys necessary to decrypt the communications data.69 According to the
62Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your
World (WW Norton & Company, 2015) 119.
63Bruce Schneier, Data and Goliath: The Hidden Battles to Collect Your Data and Control Your
World (WW Norton & Company, 2015) 119–120.
64Susan Landau, ‘Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-sector Telecommunications Infra-
structure’ (2014) 7 J Nat’l Sec L & Pol’y 411, 411, 424. By the year 2000, cryptography for retail
purposes was no longer subject to export controls Susan Landau, ‘Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts
to Secure Private-sector Telecommunications Infrastructure’ (2014) 7 J Nat’l Sec L & Pol’y 411,
411, 425. Revisions to Encryption Items, 15 CFR §§ 734, 740, 742, 770, 772, and 774.
65Susan Landau, ‘Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-sector Telecommunications Infra-
structure’ (2014) 7 J Nat’l Sec L & Pol’y 411, 424. Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement
Act, 47 USC § 229 (1994).
66The White House, ‘White House Announcement of the Clipper Initiative’ (Statement by the Press
Secretary 1993) <groups.csail.mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/crypto/clipper-announcement.
html> accessed 27 August 2015.
67While the programme was publically billed as voluntary, experts doubted the feasibility of this. Fol-
lowing successful Freedom of Information Act requests, EPIC reported how a briefing document sent
to the National Security Council in February 1993, ‘Encryption: The Threat, Applications and Poten-
tial Solutions’ concluded that: ‘Technical solutions, such as they are, will only work if they are incor-
porated into *all* encryption products. To ensure that this occurs, legislation mandating the use of
Government-approved encryption products or adherence to Government encryption criteria is
required’. As pointed out by then EPIC Legal Counsel David Sobel, ‘the newly-disclosed information
demonstrates that the architects of the Clipper program – the NSA and the FBI – have always recog-
nized that key-escrow must eventually be mandated’. Electronic Privacy Information Center (Press
Release 16 August 1995) <https://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/press_release.html> accessed 27
August 2015. See also Electronic Privacy Information Center ‘FBI Documents on Encryption’ (Repo-
sitory) <https://epic.org/crypto/ban/fbi_dox/> accessed 27 August 2015.
68Presidential Directive Authorizing the Clipper Initiative (Declassified Document Obtained by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center under the Freedom of Information Act 1993) <groups.csail.
mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/crypto/clipper-directive.html> accessed 27 August 2015.
69Presidential Directive Authorizing the Clipper Initiative (Declassified Document Obtained by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center under the Freedom of Information Act 1993) <groups.csail.
mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/crypto/clipper-directive.html> accessed 27 August 2015.
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Directive, government agencies could only gain access to the communications where they
could demonstrate appropriate legal authority to the key holders.70
The Clipper Chip was intended to facilitate encrypted communication while enabling gov-
ernment authorities to retain privileged access. In effect, the initiative created a government back-
door, but ‘not a secret one.A public one’.71While theUS government had hoped that theClipper
initiativewouldbe a compromise solution,72 the proposal led towide-spread outrage amongst the
technology community73 and the initiativewas eventually dropped for reasons of practicality and
the First Amendment argument that computer code constitutes protected speech.74
The latest Crypto War
In the wake of the Snowden revelations, technology companies scrambled to rebuild trust
with their customers. As the ability of technology companies to resist handing over infor-
mation to the US government under secretive legal procedures was in doubt, Apple
designed its newer products to prevent such a situation from arising again.75 In all iPads
and all iPhone iterations subsequent to the iPhone 3GS, Apple facilitates encryption of
device content. Apple devices are encrypted in order to protect the data stored on the
device (including contacts, call logs and email) against any individual who has physical
access to the device but does not know the passcode necessary to decrypt it.76
70Presidential Directive Authorizing the Clipper Initiative (Declassified Document Obtained by the
Electronic Privacy Information Center under the Freedom of Information Act 1993) <groups.csail.
mit.edu/mac/classes/6.805/articles/crypto/clipper-directive.html> accessed 27 August 2015.
71Gordon Corera, Intercept: The Secret History of Computers and Spies (Weidenfeld & Nicholson,
2015) 126–127.
72Susan Landau, ‘Under the Radar: NSA’s Efforts to Secure Private-sector Telecommunications Infra-
structure’ (2014) 7 JNat’l Sec L&Pol’y 411, 422; JohnMarkoff, ‘Electronics PlanAims toBalanceGov-
ernment Access with Privacy’ New York Times (New York 16 April 1993) <http://www.nytimes.com/
1993/04/16/us/electronics-plan-aims-to-balance-government-access-with-privacy.html> accessed 27
August 2015. John Markoff, ‘Communication Plan Draws Mixed Reaction’ New York Times
(New York 17 April 1993) <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/04/17/business/communications-plan-
draws-mixed-reaction.html> accessed 27 August 2015.
73Steven Levy, ‘Battle of the Clipper Chip’ New York Times (New York 12 June 1994) <www.nytimes.
com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm> accessed 27
August 2015; Gregory Ferenstein, ‘How Hackers Beat The NSA In The ’90s And How They Can Do
It Again’ Tech Crunch (28 June 2013) <techcrunch.com/2013/06/28/how-hackers-beat-the-nsa-in-the-
90s-and-how-they-can-do-it-again/> accessed 27 August 2015.
74In 1999, export controls on encryption were found to be unconstitutional by the 9th Circuit Court of
Appeals on First Amendment grounds. The Court stated that government efforts to control encryption
‘may well implicate not only the First Amendment rights of cryptographers intent on pushing the
boundaries of their science, but also the constitutional rights of each of us as potential recipients of
encryption bounty’. Bernstein v US Dep’t of Justice, 192 F 3d 1308 (9th Cir 1999), 4242. Gregory
Ferenstein, ‘How Hackers Beat The NSA In The ’90s And How They Can Do It Again’ Tech
Crunch (28 June 2013) <techcrunch.com/2013/06/28/how-hackers-beat-the-nsa-in-the-90s-and-
how-they-can-do-it-again/> accessed 27 August 2015.
75Craig Timberg, ‘Apple will no Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, even with Search
Warrants’ Washington Post (Washington 18 September 2014) <www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html> accessed 27 August
2015; Jay McGregor, ‘Apple Beefs Up iOS8 Security With Unbreakable Passcode’ Forbes (18 Sep-
tember 2014) <www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2014/09/18/ios8-beefs-up-security-with-
unbreakable-passcode/> accessed 27 August 2015.
76EFF, ‘How to: Encrypt Your iPhone Surveillance Self-Defense’ (EFF 18 November 2014) <https://
ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-encrypt-your-iphone> accessed 27 August 2015.
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In September 2014, Apple boasted of its ability to thwart government data requests by
designing its newer products to block Apple access to customer information.77 In what has
been described as ‘an engineering solution to a legal quandary’,78 the revised Apple policy
means that only the individual/consumer has access to the data stored on their Apple device.
While this access was previously shared with Apple, following the updated privacy policy,
Apple no longer has the ability to access this data, even when compelled to do so under a
binding legal order.79 The economic and public relations interest in this announcement was
underlined by the statement from Apple that ‘unlike our competitors, Apple cannot bypass
your passcode and therefore cannot access this data’.80 The policy change was well-
received by privacy advocates, security experts, and consumers.81 Accordingly, it was
unsurprising when Google followed with similar pledges.82
77Craig Timberg, ‘Apple will no Longer UnlockMost iPhones, iPads for Police, even with SearchWar-
rants’ Washington Post (Washington 18 September 2014) <www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html> accessed 27 August
2015; JayMcGregor, ‘Apple Beefs Up iOS8 SecurityWithUnbreakable Passcode’Forbes (18 Septem-
ber 2014) <www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2014/09/18/ios8-beefs-up-security-with-unbreakable-
passcode/> accessed 27August 2015. It is important to note that any data uploaded to cloud services can
still be retrievable through legal warrants. John Leyden, ‘Apple Slaps a Passcode Lock on iOS 8
Devices, but Cops can still Inhale your iCloud’ The Register (23 September 2014) <www.theregister.
co.uk/2014/09/23/icloud_hole_in_ios8_passcode_protection/> accessed 27 August 2015; In addition,
while the new system has been praised by experts, remaining vulnerabilities have also been identified.
JonathanZdziarski, ‘Your iOS8Data isNotBeyondLawEnforcement’sReach…Yet’Zdziarski’s Blog
of Things (17 September 2014) <www.zdziarski.com/blog/?p=3875> accessed 27 August 2015.
78Craig Timberg, ‘Apple will no Longer Unlock Most iPhones, iPads for Police, even with Search
Warrants’ Washington Post (Washington 18 September 2014) <www.washingtonpost.com/business/
technology/2014/09/17/2612af58-3ed2-11e4-b03f-de718edeb92f_story.html> accessed 27 August
2015; Jay McGregor, ‘Apple Beefs Up iOS8 Security With Unbreakable Passcode’ Forbes (18 Sep-
tember 2014) <www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2014/09/18/ios8-beefs-up-security-with-
unbreakable-passcode/> accessed 27 August 2015.
79Jay McGregor, ‘Apple Beefs Up iOS8 Security With Unbreakable Passcode’ Forbes (18 September
2014) <www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2014/09/18/ios8-beefs-up-security-with-unbreakable-
passcode/> accessed 27 August 2015.
80Jay McGregor, ‘Apple Beefs Up iOS8 Security With Unbreakable Passcode’ Forbes (18 September
2014) <www.forbes.com/sites/jaymcgregor/2014/09/18/ios8-beefs-up-security-with-unbreakable-
passcode/> accessed 27 August 2015.
81Kevin Poulsen, ‘Apple’s iPhone Encryption Is a Godsend, Even if Cops Hate It’ Wired (8 October
2014) <www.wired.com/2014/10/golden-key/> accessed 27 August 2015; Open letter from Civil
Society Organizations Companies and Trade Associations Security and Policy Experts to President
Obama (19 May 19 2015) <https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/3138–113/Encryption_
Letter_to_Obama_final_051915.pdf> accessed 27 August 2015; Adam Clark Estes, ‘Cops Have
No Right to Be Angry About the iPhone’s New Encryption’ Gizmodo (23 September 2014)
<gizmodo.com/cops-have-no-right-to-be-angry-about-apples-improved-se-1638256237> accessed
27 August 2015; Iain Thomson, ‘FBI Boss: Apple’s iPhone, iPad Encryption puts People “Above
the Law”’ The Register (25 September 2014) <www.theregister.co.uk/2014/09/25/fbi_boss_slams_
google_apple_for_encryption_that_puts_users_above_law/> accessed 27 August 2015; Bruce Schne-
ier, ‘Stop the Hysteria over Apple Encryption’ Schneier on Security (3 October 2014) <https://www.
schneier.com/essays/archives/2014/10/stop_the_hysteria_ov.html> accessed 27 August 2015; Jenni-
fer Abel, ‘Privacy Advocates and Tech Giants Support Encryption, which the FBI Director finds
“Depressing”’ Consumer Affairs (21 May 2015) <www.consumeraffairs.com/news/privacy-
advocates-and-tech-giants-support-encryption-which-the-fbi-director-finds-depressing-052115.html>
accessed 27 August
82Darren Pauli, ‘Google Apple Grapple brings Crypto Cop Block to Android’ The Register (19 Sep-
tember 2014) <www.theregister.co.uk/2014/09/19/google_apple_grapple_brings_crypto_cop_block_
to_android/> accessed 27 August.
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While investigative authorities have long bemoaned the obstacles created by encryption,
the Apple policy change incited heightened debate on the topic. The Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation’s (FBI’s) James Comey railed against Apple’s announcement and criticised the use of
such encryption systems generally.83Comeywarned that the popularisation of encryption tech-
nologies ‘threatens to lead us all to a very, very dark place’.84 Suchwarnings are reminiscent of
statements made during the original Crypto War. Testifying before Congress in 1995, then
Director of the FBI, Louis Freeh, stated that public-key encryption ‘jeopardizes the public
safety and national security of this country’.85 According to Comey, companies who are cur-
rently not subject to the US Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act should
be compelled to build ‘lawful intercept capabilities for law enforcement’.86 Such access
would require security ‘back doors’ to be built into technology services and products that
provide encryption. According to its updated privacy policy, Apple would be technologically
unable to compromise its customers’ privacy in this manner.
Since Comey’s initial statements, he has testified before Senate Committees on this
issue. While Comey maintains his position that exceptional government access is necessary,
he provides no further detail as to how such access could be safely granted.87 Even broadly
described proposals for what a system of exceptional government access to communi-
cations should look like vary in their details. For example, the director of the NSA,
Michael Rogers, has argued that ‘back door’ is an inappropriate term in this context and
that investigative authorities are actually seeking ‘front door’ access. By this, Rogers
draws attention to the fact that in their public statements, investigative agency representa-
tives have only called for exceptional access on foot of appropriate legal authority. While
this is primarily an issue of semantics, Rogers has extended the metaphor and has argued
that the ideal system would have multiple locks.88 This is a reference to split-key
83Igor Bobic and Ryan Reilly, ‘FBI Director James Comey “Very Concerned” About New Apple,
Google Privacy Features’ Huffington Post (25 September 2014) <www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/
09/25/james-comey-apple-encryption_n_5882874.html> accessed 27 August.
84James Comey, ‘Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?’
(Speech at the Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 2014) <https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/
going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course> accessed 27 August;
Spencer Ackerman, ‘FBI Director Attacks Tech Companies for Embracing New Modes of Encryp-
tion’ The Guardian (London 16 October 2014) <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/16/fbi-
director-attacks-tech-companies-encryption> accessed 27 August.
85Freeh argued that ‘Drug cartels, terrorists, and kidnappers will use telephones and other communi-
cations media with impunity knowing that their conversations are immune’ from interception. Charles
Mann, ‘Homeland Insecurity’ The Atlantic Monthly (Washington 28 June 2002) <www.charlesmann.
org/articles/Homeland-Insecurity-Atlantic.pdf> accessed 27 August.
86James Comey, ‘Going Dark: Are Technology, Privacy, and Public Safety on a Collision Course?’
(Speech at the Brookings Institute, Washington DC, 2014) <https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/
going-dark-are-technology-privacy-and-public-safety-on-a-collision-course> accessed 27 August;
Spencer Ackerman, ‘FBI Director Attacks Tech Companies for Embracing New Modes of Encryp-
tion’ The Guardian (London 16 October 2014) <www.theguardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/16/fbi-
director-attacks-tech-companies-encryption> accessed 27 August.
87Jenna McLaughlin, ‘FBI Director Says Scientists Are Wrong, Pitches Imaginary Solution to
Encryption Dilemma’ The Intercept (8 July 2015) <https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/07/08/fbi-
director-comey-proposes-imaginary-solution-encryption/> accessed 27 August.
88Ellen Nakashima and Barton Gellman, ‘As Encryption Spreads, US Grapples with Clash between
Privacy, Security)’ Washington Post (Washington 10 April 2015) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/as-encryption-spreads-us-worries-about-access-to-data-for-investigations/2015/
04/10/7c1c7518-d401-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html> accessed 27 August.
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systems which allow for the creation of a digital key but separates that key ‘so that no one
person or agency alone’ has the sole power to use it.89
Whether using the term back door or front door, however, security experts agree that the
creation of special access to encrypted information constitutes the creation of intentional
vulnerabilities in encryption systems.90 While there is some intuitive appeal to the
concept that governments should be able to gain special access to communications in
order to prevent crime, the security community have highlighted the impossible promise
of a ‘golden key’ solution.91 The reason such a solution is not possible is because ‘any vul-
nerability in an information system may be exploited by criminals and law enforcement
agencies in equal measure’.92 As much as one might wish there was a ‘golden key’ solution
that would permit lawful government access to encrypted information without compromis-
ing Internet communications, no such solution has ever been identified.93 Eric Schmidt of
Google summed up this position when he stated that,
[i]f we put a trap door in our system, first, we would have to disclose it because people would
find out anyway. And second, some evil person in addition to the good guys would figure out a
way to get in.94
89Ellen Nakashima and Barton Gellman, ‘As Encryption Spreads, US Grapples with Clash between
Privacy, Security’ Washington Post (Washington 10 April 2015) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/national-security/as-encryption-spreads-us-worries-about-access-to-data-for-investigations/
2015/04/10/7c1c7518-d401-11e4-a62f-ee745911a4ff_story.html> accessed 27 August.
90Harold Abelson and others, ‘Keys Under Doormats: Mandating Insecurity by Requiring Govern-
ment Access to all Data and Communications’ (Computer Science and Artificial Intelligence Labora-
tory Technical Report 2015) <dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-
026.pdf?sequence=8> accessed 27 August.
91Editorial, ‘Compromise Needed on Smartphone Encryption’Washington Post (Washington 3 October
2014) <https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/compromise-needed-on-smartphone-encryption/
2014/10/03/96680bf8-4a77-11e4-891d-713f052086a0_story.html> accessed 27 August; Jeremy
Gillula, ‘Even a Golden Key Can Be Stolen by Thieves: The Simple Facts of Apple’s Encryption
Decision’ Electronic Frontier Foundation (10 October 2014) <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/
even-golden-key-can-be-stolen-thieves-simple-facts-apples-encryption-decision> accessed 27 August;
Mike Masnick, ‘Washington Post’s Clueless Editorial On Phone Encryption: No Backdoors, But How
About A Magical “Golden Key”?’ Tech Dirt (6 October 2014) <https://www.techdirt.com/articles/
20141006/01082128740/washington-posts-braindead-editorial-phone-encryption-no-backdoors-how-
about-magical-golden-key.shtml> accessed 27 August.
92Article 19, ‘Response to UN Special Rapporteur’s Call for Comments on Encryption and Anonym-
ity’ (Submission February 2015) 14 <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Communications/
Article19.pdf> accessed 27 August 2015; Jeremy Gillula, ‘Even a Golden Key Can Be Stolen by
Thieves: The Simple Facts of Apple’s Encryption Decision’ Electronic Frontier Foundation (10
October 2014) <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/even-golden-key-can-be-stolen-thieves-
simple-facts-apples-encryption-decision> accessed 27 August.
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ity’ (Submission February 2015) <www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/Communications/
Article19.pdf> accessed 27 August 2015; Jeremy Gillula, ‘Even a Golden Key Can Be Stolen by
Thieves: The Simple Facts of Apple’s Encryption Decision’ Electronic Frontier Foundation (10
October 2014) <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/10/even-golden-key-can-be-stolen-thieves-
simple-facts-apples-encryption-decision> accessed 27 August.
94AFP, ‘Tech Firms “Will Win” Encryption Battle: Google Chief’ Security Week (18 March 2015)
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With no specific technological solution currently being proposed, technology companies
and security experts remain at odds with law enforcement and surveillance interests. In July
2015, the Washington Post pointed out that Silicon Valley and Washington ‘have spent the
past year arguing over whether technology companies should enable users to encrypt their
digital lives in such a way that not even the Federal Bureau of Investigation could unscramble
the information’.95 While President Obama has made some supportive statements,96 he has
admitted to leaning ‘probably further in the direction of strong encryption than some do
inside of law enforcement’.97 It has been argued that there is ‘zero chance’ of any anti-encryp-
tion legislation being passed by the US Congress absent a ‘catastrophic event which clearly
could have been stopped if the government had been able to break some encryption’.98Accord-
ingly, while there is strong support for new law amongst US law enforcement and surveillance
authorities, legislation mandating exceptional access is unlikely in the immediate future.
The situation appears different in theUKwhereDavidCameron has yet to back down from
his 2015 General Election pledges strongly opposed to consumer encryption.99 Cameron has
stated that he believes it should always be possible to gain access to communications where the
HomeSecretary has signed awarrant.100 In a response to a question in Parliament in June 2015,
Cameron maintained the pre-election campaign position, arguing that the government simply
wants to ensure that ‘terrorists do not have a safe space in which to communicate’.101
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Reiterating his election statements, Cameron stated that the government must consider all new
media and ensure that the authorities are always able to ‘on the signature of a warrant, to get to
the bottomofwhat is going on’.102While it shouldbenoted that a spokesperson has since stated
that the PrimeMinister accepts and recognises the importance of encryption and has no plans to
outlaw it completely, the same spokesperson’s reiteration that the British government believes
‘terrorists cannot have a safe space in which to operate’ online undermines the significance of
the initial reassurance.103
Interplay of interests
Adopting the position that strong encryption is an essential privacy tool in the modern
world, it is necessary to investigate how the use of such technology can be protected. In
order to assess the best available options, it is necessary to consider, once again, our
primary stakeholders: governments, technology companies, individuals/consumers, and
security experts. It is sensible to consider how the legitimate interests and incentives of
these major parties should influence policy in this area. First and foremost, it is clear that
all four parties have an incentive to protect the security of information.104 This common
incentive is a boon to privacy as security is an essential precondition to privacy. In addition
to the common interest in information security, an overlapping interest in privacy protection
exists between the individual and technology companies, if only because privacy
encourages greater use and uptake of technological products and services. Following the
anti-encryption remarks from David Cameron, several technology companies have threa-
tened to take their business out of the UK.105 Even though Comey recognises the economic
cost of building government access into communications products and services, Comey
maintains that American companies should be forced to modify their products.106 While
Comey acknowledges that companies based in other countries might gain a competitive
advantage, he believes that American companies should be willing to ‘take that hit’.107
102Adam Bienkov, ‘David Cameron: Twitter and Facebook Privacy is Unsustainable’ Politics.co.uk
(30 June 2015) <www.politics.co.uk/news/2015/06/30/david-cameron-twitter-and-facebook-
privacy-is-unsustainable> accessed 27 August.
103Rob Price, ‘The UK Government Insists it’s Not Going to Try and Ban Encryption’ Business
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Supporting the argument for strong encryption, therefore, are both security and econ-
omic factors. In spite of clear potential for economic and security harm, continued
support in some quarters for weakened encryption security indicates a strong – perhaps
overriding – government interest in the unencumbered conduction of surveillance. In
spite of the expressed desire to weaken encryption systems in order to enable government
access, there is an argument to be made that a secure system, based on strong encryption, is
more important for technologically and economically advanced countries than to other
countries. As pointed out by Edward Snowden, there seems to be little sense in the US
policy – the country with the biggest vault of valuable information to lose – to be lowering
the standards of vaults worldwide.108 Similar arguments could be made in the UK context.
Such reasoning echoes the opinions of security experts who, for many years, have
argued against granting any exceptional access to government agencies.109 Of particular
note is a recent report written by an expert group of security technologists.110 The
authors of this report include such security luminaries as Whitfield Diffie, Ronald Rivest,
and Bruce Schneier. The report states that granting back door access to governments will
‘open doors through which criminals and malicious nation-states can attack the very indi-
viduals law enforcement seeks to defend’.111 According to the report, ‘the costs would be
substantial, the damage to innovation severe, and the consequences to economic growth dif-
ficult to predict’.112
In spite of their great interest in security, certain sections of the US and UK govern-
ments113 still pursue anti-encryption policies – through technological exploitation and
sabotage as well as proposals for encryption inhibiting laws.114 These policies indicate
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a willingness on the part of governments to trade a degree of security for perceived intel-
ligence benefits. This preference should not be ignored. If policy is to be influenced, the
real incentives and interests of the parties should be recognised and better – more pro-
tective – solutions sought. Accordingly, it is important to look for alternative incentives
and to consider how else government policy can be influenced. This calls for consider-
ation of what the appropriate role of law is in this area and requires the investigation of
how to best conceptualise arguments in favour of enhanced security and by implication
privacy.
Human right to encryption?
As economic and information security arguments have failed to convince government auth-
orities to fully support encryption, it is reasonable to consider whether a human rights obli-
gation could be identified in order to compel such support, or perhaps, more realistically, to
limit the extent to which governments interfere with encryption standards. The concept of
encryption as a human right has received increased attention recently, most notably in the
report of David Kaye for the United Nations.115 In his report, Kaye concluded that ‘States
should adopt policies of non-restriction or comprehensive protection’ towards encryption
and anonymity and States should only impose restrictions on these tools on a case-specific
basis.116 As a human right to encryption is not found in international texts in the same
manner as the right to privacy is, the question becomes whether encryption is essential
for the protection of other rights.
From the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) perspective it is clear that
Article 10 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR are likely to be most relevant to the issue of
encryption. The structure of these rights is quite similar with the first paragraph of
Article 8 ECHR guaranteeing the right to respect for private and family life and the
first paragraph of Article 10 ECHR protecting freedom of expression. Freedom of
expression includes the freedom to ‘hold opinions and to receive and impart information
and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers’.117 Both
Articles 8 and 10 ECHR are limited by similarly phrased second paragraphs.118
Article 8 ECHR may be interfered with where the interference is ‘in accordance with
the law’,
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the econ-
omic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.119
NSA’s Back Doors’ New York Times (New York 21 September 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/
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Similarly, Article 10 ECHR may be limited where restrictions are ‘prescribed by law’,
‘necessary in a democratic society’ and
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation
or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.120
Freedom of expression and privacy are integrally linked in a democratic society.121
When an individual does not enjoy privacy, their freedom of expression can be inhibited,
for example, by encouraging individuals to self-censor.122 As history provides many
examples of surveillance being abused to control dissenters in times of supposed emer-
gency, the importance of secure communications is clear.123 The link between privacy
and freedom of expression was acknowledged by the Committee of Ministers of the
Council of Europe in a 2003 declaration that called on Member States to respect the
desire of Internet users to conceal their identity.124 The Committee of Ministers stated
that protection against surveillance and the enhancement of free expression required
States to ‘respect the will of users of the Internet not to disclose their identity’.125 This
stance recognises that individuals will be less likely to gather information and to formulate
and discuss ideas if they suspect that they are being watched.
In order to begin thinking about whether encryption is a necessary aspect of privacy
and/or free expression rights, it is important to consider what encryption is in a conceptual
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subversive. See Frederick Schauer, ‘Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the Chilling
Effect’ (1978) 58 BUL Rev 685, 690.
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sense. Is encryption a munition, a tool for terrorists and criminals,126 or is encryption some-
thing else? It is contended that, at its core, encryption protects the sanctity of an individual’s
thoughts, communications, and in some cases, their anonymity.127
As Article 8 ECHR guarantees respect for correspondence128 and private life,129 gov-
ernment interference with encryption – a key tool used by many to protect the security of
communications – clearly requires consideration of the Article.130 In addition to protecting
the content of communications, Article 10 ECHR also protects ‘the means of transmission
or reception’ of communications. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has held
that any restriction on the means of communication ‘necessarily interferes with the right to
receive and impart information’.131 As encryption is an essential tool chosen by many who
wish to communicate securely, it seems clear that government interference with encryption
also requires scrutiny under Article 10 ECHR.
While government interference with encryption will require consideration of privacy
and free expression rights, the second paragraphs of Articles 8 and 10 ECHR clearly indi-
cate the non-absolute nature of these rights. Similarly, the Committee of Ministers has
recognised that the importance of anonymity does not prevent Member States
from taking measures and co-operating in order to trace those responsible for criminal acts,
in accordance with national law, the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms and other international agreements in the fields of justice and the
police.132
In a non-encryption context, the ECtHR has adopted a cautious approach when considering
the existence of a right to online anonymity. While the ECtHR in KU v Finland linked anon-
ymity to privacy and free expression, the Court also highlighted the limited nature of the
right by pointing out that ‘such guarantees cannot be absolute and must yield on occasion
to other legitimate imperatives, such as the prevention of disorder or crime or the protection
126Indeed, the Chief of Detectives for the Chicago PoliceDepartment, John Escalante, argued that ‘Apple
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ECHR 427 [61]; PG and JH v The United Kingdom [2001] ECHR 550 [56]; X v Iceland [1976] 5 D
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of the rights and freedoms of others’.133 Similarly, in a case concerning the obligations of
Internet news portals (Delfi AS v Estonia), the Grand Chamber argued that anonymity on the
Internet is an important value, but must be balanced against other rights and interests.134
While not directly concerned with encryption, the cases of KU v Finland and Delfi AS v
Estonia are of assistance when attempting to assess how the ECtHR might view State
restriction of encryption standards as similar tensions are embodied in the encryption
debate.
As restrictions on encryption could clearly hinder the receipt and imparting of infor-
mation without interference by public authorities135 and restrictions could also constitute
an interference by public authorities in the private life of individuals,136 any legislation
restricting encryption would have to be deemed to be prescribed by law and necessary in
a democratic society in the pursuit of a legitimate aim. In light of this conclusion, it is
necessary to consider how Article 8 ECHR and Article 10 ECHR might apply to recent
activities of US and UK intelligence agencies.
It is clear that intelligence agencies have made many covert efforts to restrict encryp-
tion. Documents released by Snowden indicate the existence of a major NSA decryption
program, codenamed as Bullrun.137 According to the documents released, the purpose of
the Bullrun program is to ‘defeat the encryption used in specific network communication
technologies’.138 These documents were leaked to the New York Times, which reported
that the NSA was ‘winning its long-running secret war on encryption, using supercompu-
ters, technical trickery, court orders and behind-the-scenes persuasion to undermine the
major tools protecting the privacy of everyday communications in the Internet age’.139
Unsurprisingly, GCHQ developed its own comparable anti-encryption program, code-
named ‘Edgehill’.140
133KU v Finland [2008] ECHR 1563 [49]; Article 19, ‘Response to UN Special Rapporteur’s Call for
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A key feature of these programs was the scrupulous commitment to secrecy. Leaked
documents revealed how reports ‘generated from BULLRUN-derived information’ were
not to reveal ‘BULLRUN details’.141 GCHQ analysts were instructed to neither ‘ask
about’ nor ‘speculate on sources or methods underpinning Bullrun’.142 On the test of leg-
ality it seems clear that the surreptitious anti-encryption activities of surveillance agencies
as exposed in the Snowden revelations would fail to meet the requirement of legality
under the Convention. When assessing whether an intrusive measure meets the test of leg-
ality, the ECtHR asks whether the measure has ‘some basis in domestic law’,143 whether
the law is adequately accessible,144 and whether the requirement of foreseeability has been
met.145 The rule of law requires that domestic surveillance law protects against ‘arbitrary
interference’ by government authorities with the rights of individuals.146 Assiduousness to
this principle is particularly important where the government exercises power in secret as
when actions are obscured from public scrutiny, there is an increased risk of
arbitrariness.147
To take one particularly egregious example, consider the SIM card scandal, most associ-
ated with the company Gemalto.148 According to documents released by Snowden and
reported on by the Intercept, the NSA and GCHQ hacked into Gemalto systems in order
to steal the SIM card encryption keys used to protect the privacy of mobile phone communi-
cations.149 As pointed out by the Intercept, access to SIM card encryption keys enables
direct access to mobile communications without the need to seek legal authority or
cooperation from telecommunications companies.150 Even though Gemalto dispute
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whether encryption keys were successfully stolen, the company investigation151 did ident-
ify unauthorised activity in the Gemalto systems at the relevant time.152 While there is some
debate153 as to the eventual success of this hacking activity, a leaked GCHQ document
expresses the belief that GCHQ has had access to the entire Gemalto Network.154 It
seems indisputable that such a covert action would constitute a breach of Article 8
ECHR and potentially a breach of Article 10 ECHR also. This secretive interference
with the encrypted system clearly lacked an adequate basis in law and the method of inves-
tigation was neither accessible nor foreseeable to the public.
Of course, merely making a rights-infringing law accessible and foreseeable is not suf-
ficient in and of itself in order to ensure compliance with the Convention. Any piece of
legislation mandating exceptional government access to encrypted communications must
be justifiable under the Convention. Assuming that legislation is promulgated in the ordin-
ary fashion and is sufficiently precise, there is no reason to assume it would fall foul of the
legality requirements of Articles 8 and 10 ECHR. Instead, the core question is likely to lie in
the necessity test. In order to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’, intrusions should be
necessary and proportionate in the pursuit of a legitimate aim.155 The ECtHR has stated
151Ronald Prins (Security expert) contended that a ‘true forensic investigation in such a complex
environment is not possible’ in the time in which Gemalto conducted its investigation. In a similar
vein, ACLU technologist, Christopher Soghoian, remarked how ‘Gemalto, a company that operates
in 85 countries, has figured out how to do a thorough security audit of their systems in 6 days.
Remarkable’. Jeremy Scahill, ‘Gemalto Doesn’t KnowWhat It Doesn’t Know’ The Intercept (25 Feb-
ruary 2015) <https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/02/25/gemalto-doesnt-know-doesnt-know/>
accessed 27 August; Iain Thomson, ‘SIM Hack Scandal Biz Gemalto: Everything’s Fine … Security
Industry: No, it’s really not’ The Register (25 February 2015) <www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/25/
gemalto_everythings_fine_security_industry_hang_on_a_minute/> accessed 27 August.
152Simon Sharwood, ‘Gemalto: NSA, GCHQ Hacked Us – but didn’t Snatch Crucial SIM Keys’ The
Register (25 February 2015) <www.theregister.co.uk/2015/02/25/gemalto_spooks_popped_our_
lans_not_sim_keys/> accessed 27 August.
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Thomson pointed out that Matt Green (Johns Hopkins University) has previously shown how 3G
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that ‘“necessary”… implies the existence of a “pressing social need” for the interference in
question156 and the interference must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’.157 If
other means of surveillance could be used to achieve the same result while causing a lesser
interference, the alternative measures must be seriously considered.158 A crucial aspect of
the necessity inquiry will be the position adopted by the inquirer on the question of whether
the times we live in represent a ‘golden age of surveillance’ or whether the intelligence
available to agencies is at risk of ‘going dark’.159
In 2011, Swire and Ahmad argued that ‘the big picture for agency access to data is
mostly “golden”. The loss of agency access to information, due to encryption, is more
than offset by surveillance gains from computing and communications technology’.160 In
light of the massive surveillance powers unveiled following the Snowden revelations, it
seems even less plausible that government restrictions on encryption could meet the stan-
dards of necessity in 2015.161 In his report on encryption, David Kaye pointed out that gov-
ernments have access to a wide array of alternative surveillance tools including
wiretapping, geo-location and tracking, data-mining and traditional physical surveil-
lance.162 Indeed, in specific reference to Apple’s new encryption policy, security expert,
156Dudgeon v The United Kingdom [1981] ECHR 5 [51].
157Applied in the Article 8 ECHR context in Silver v The United Kingdom [1983] ECHR 5 [97], citing
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achieve the desired result”’. Human Rights Committee, ‘General Comment No 27 on Freedom of
Movement’ (1999) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 [14] Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the
Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and
Expression, David Kaye’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/3, 12. When proportionality is considered by
theECtHR, however, ‘it is not a scientific process’. AsChristoffersen notes, the classical proportionality
factors are not applied in a strict manner but are considered as weighted considerations on a scale in the
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(Martinus Neijhoff, 2009); David Feldman, Civil Liberties and Human Rights in England and Wales
(OUP, 2002) 57; David Harris and others, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Butter-
worths, 1995) 301; Benjamin Goold and others, Public Protection, Proportionality, and the Search for
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adopted the least restrictive means doctrine, described by Arai-Takahashi as ‘one of the most stringent
forms of proportionality appraisal’. Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine and
the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Intersentia, 2002) 11.
159Peter Swire and Kenesa Ahmad ‘“Going Dark” Versus a “Golden Age for Surveillance”’ (Center
for Democracy and Technology, CDT Fellows Focus 2011) <https://cdt.org/blog/‘going-dark’-versus-
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Jonathan Zdziarski, stated that ‘eliminating the iPhone as one source I don’t think is going
to wreck a lot of cases’. According to Zdziarski, ‘there is such a mountain of other evidence
from call logs, email logs, iCloud, Gmail logs. They’re tapping the whole Internet’.163
As government interference with encryption standards will impact everyone who uses the
Internet, a high standardof necessitymust bemet.Adifficulty in reaching this standard is posed
by the fact that terrorists and organised criminals are those most likely to circumvent weak
encryption.164 Accordingly, it is questionable whether broad proposals to weaken encryption
can meet the criteria of relevancy and sufficiency.165 Kaye has pointed out that a proportion-
ality analysis should also consider the fact that ‘encroachments on encryption and anonymity
will be exploited by the same criminal and terrorist networks that the limitations aim to
deter’.166 Bearing all these factors in mind, it is difficult to see how laws requiring companies
to build vulnerabilities into encryption products could be compatible with the ECHR.
Compelled disclosure: the least undesirable alternative?
While there is some merit to the position that any interference with encryption standards
creates unacceptable vulnerabilities in our communications systems, there is value to con-
sidering what kind of regime could allow for some limited interference with encrypted com-
munications where it was necessary for the protection of society from crime and terrorism.
While it is maintained that other measures would be preferable under a Convention analy-
sis, one alternative scheme would require the mandatory disclosure of encryption keys.
Variations of this approach are already practiced in several countries, including, somewhat
infamously, in the UKwhere refusal to disclose a key has the potential to result in a five year
prison sentence.167
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New York Times (New York 26 September 2014) <www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/technology/
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165It is necessary to consider whether the reasons provided by the national authorities in order to
defend the interfering measure are “relevant and sufficient” under the Convention. Handyside v
The United Kingdom [1976] ECHR 5 [50]. There is an argument that even if the ECtHR adopts a
looser approach to the proportionality test that national authorities should apply the standard more
rigidly. National authorities do, after all, have greater knowledge of the conditions and implications
of their policies. In the surveillance context, a strict application of the proportionality test would
require that the measures adopted would be ‘both suitable and necessary to achieve a legitimate
aim’ and would strike a reasonable balance between the interests served and the interests affected.
Janneke Gerards, ‘The Prism of Fundamental Rights’ (2012) 8 EuConst 173, 200.
166Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, David Kaye’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/29/3, 12.
167Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 s 49. For an example of how this section has been used,
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Themodel version of such a system from an ECHR perspective would require law enfor-
cement to apply to an independent court or tribunal in order to compel the disclosure of
encryption keys by the encryption key holder. The ECtHR has itself recognised that judicial
control provides ‘the best guarantees of independence, impartiality and a proper pro-
cedure’.168 In cases where technology companies have excluded themselves from this
knowledge – as Apple have done – it would be necessary to compel individual users to
provide this information. Failure to comply would be a crime. While issues remain with
this approach – particularly regardingwhether such a systemwould constitute an interference
with Article 6 ECHR169 – it would enable some government interference with encrypted
communications while circumventing the most dangerous aspects of back door access.
An additional benefit of a system of compelled disclosure (as described) is the intrinsic
requirement that the individual be involved in the process.170 This built-in trait necessitates
a kind of transparency that is rare in the surveillance field. Transparency has been called the
‘cornerstone’ of good governance as it has an essential role to play in reducing abuse and
enhancing public confidence.171 By opening the procedure up to the targeted individual,
arbitrary or unreasonable requests can be more readily challenged. Crucially, this system
provides an option for government agencies and law enforcement to obtain information
without making such interference the immediate automatic choice.
Conclusion
A lot of the debate concerning government restriction and sabotage of encryption has
revolved around the overlapping interests of the parties involved and the fact that govern-
ments that restrict encryption expose themselves and their citizens to external threats. While
these arguments have merit and are likely to be influential on government policy, they can
be limiting and should not usurp consideration of the human rights implications of govern-
ment actions. The reality is that the encryption debate demonstrates the polarised perspec-
tives of the key stakeholders. As much as security experts and technology companies may
attempt to convince government agencies that strong encryption is in the best interests of all
parties, at this point it seems unlikely that many agencies will be swayed by the security
argument alone.172
When considering the potential role for law and human rights in this area, it is important
to recall the important role that an Appellate Court played in the eventual victory of
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encryption in the original Crypto Wars.173 It is contended that the ECHR could have a
potential role to play in the latest battle. Based on the analysis in this article, serious ques-
tions of compatibility will have to be put to the UK government with regard to the promised
legislation if it proceeds as currently planned.
As a general rule, when surveillance powers are applied in a ‘blanket and indiscrimi-
nate’ manner, it is difficult to strike a fair balance between the competing public and
private interests.174 The ECtHR has stated that Article 8 ECHR would be ‘unacceptably
weakened’ if the use of modern scientific techniques in the criminal-justice system were
allowed ‘without carefully balancing the potential benefits of the extensive use of such tech-
niques against important private-life interests’.175 It seems clear that the current proposals
of the UK government fail to adequately consider the privacy and expression rights of indi-
viduals who use encryption for legitimate purposes.
While a system of compelled disclosure requires a government authority to target an
individual or organisation and to approach an independent tribunal with grounds justifying
the intrusion, a blanket ban on encryption affects all those who wish to keep their communi-
cations secure, including those who rely on encryption in order to express and develop their
political beliefs without fear of reprisal. A blanket ban will also impact innocent individuals
disproportionately as criminals will be incentivised to circumvent such a ban.176 As Phil
Zimmerman has maintained for decades, ‘[w]hen crypto is outlawed, only outlaws will
have crypto’.177 Due to these issues and the opposition of the technology and security
industry, it seems likely that the current Crypto War will end similarly to the first iteration.
Equally, in spite of dour warnings, intelligence agencies will continue to develop new
methods and technologies in order to investigate crime and terrorism.
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